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two main groups—one familiar “sporadic” disease (that
is, Jakob’s disease) and another affecting a younger age
group, as in Creutzfeldt’s case. The differing features
between the groups may reflect infection with a
differently conformed prion with a particular pattern of
spread throughout the central nervous system. Lym›
phoreticular system origins of, or infection by, this prion
may contribute to the different clinical picture.
Creutzfeldt took seven years and considerable
pains to determine the originality of the disease he
described. We should emulate his rigour and acknowl›
edge his primacy.
Conclusion
Without doubt, general anxiety about so dreadful a
possibility as bovine spongiform encephalopathy caus›
ing a similar disease in humans resulted in many work›
ers involved with bovine spongiform encephalopathy
and Creutzfeldt›Jakob disease having to reach precipi›
tate conclusions in which public safety was rightly the
prime consideration. I believe that the evidence now
available casts serious doubts on the case for a causal
link between bovine spongiform encephalopathy and
“new” variant Creutzfeldt›Jakob disease. The medical
profession should, at least, be publicly debating this as an
issue. The purpose of this paper is to start that process.
I gratefully acknowledge the help of Dr David Doyle, Dr Jim
Miller, and my sons Drs Angus and Gregor Venters for helping
me to refine and focus my arguments. I also thank Dr David
Ogilvie and Dr Sahaya Josephine for keeping me right on cau›
sality and Ralph Hoeninger and Dr Andreas Weser for their
patience and generously given guidance through the German of
Creutzfeldt’s original paper.
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Introduction
The growth in international trade and travel has
increased the likelihood that outbreaks of infection will
involve more than one country. The response to such
an international epidemiological emergency is com›
plex, involving national and international agencies. We
evaluated responses to five outbreaks, with various
transmission routes, involving more than one member
state of the EU. We examined the complex nature of
the collaboration required for an effective response
and identified critical weaknesses in coordination,
funding, and reporting.
Methods
We studied five past outbreaks, selected primarily to
capture different routes of disease transmission (table).
We compiled these case studies using various data
sources.8 Over 50 semistructured interviews were
Summary points
Increasing international trade and travel have led
to concern that there will be outbreaks of
infection involving more than one country
The detection of and response to international
outbreaks needs to be international and
coordinated
An analysis of the response to several
international outbreaks has shown inadequacies
in detection, coordination, funding, and reporting
Support for disease surveillance and control in
less developed countries should be expanded to
strengthen global surveillance
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undertaken to determine what happened, what should
have happened, why the difference, and what improve›
ments could be made. Interviewees were selected
through the relevant European disease surveillance
network(s), member states national communicable dis›
ease surveillance centres, the World Health Organiza›
tion, and the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (Atlanta, United States). The snowball
method9 identified further interviewees. We reviewed
published and unpublished material.
We undertook a postal survey with questions on
preparedness for an influenza pandemic in Europe
and the role of the European Programme for
Intervention Epidemiology Training in international
incidents. Our analyses included techniques of data tri›
angulation8 and hazard analysis of critical control
points (HACCP).10 The HACCP approach is designed
to facilitate a methodical inquiry into a complex situa›
tion which is seen as a set of interacting systems, some
of which can be made to work better.11 We used this
method to identify potential weaknesses where system
components interact or where events are critical to the
outcome. For each case study we developed flow charts
of the management processes. These helped to identify
obstacles to the effective management of emergencies.
Results
The common critical control points identified from the
five case studies are described below.
Failure to identify and report cases—Failure to notify
cases nationally12 precludes international notification
and may result in failure to recognise an incident that
involves more than one country. Detection rates for
common diseases vary widely,13 and some national sur›
veillance systems need improvement.
Failure to inform other countries—There are several
channels through which information can flow, from
informal contacts over rumours or unconfirmed events
to formal reporting within EU surveillance networks or
to WHO. At the early stages of a possible outbreak it
may be important to exchange unconfirmed infor›
mation. This requires access to secure communication
channels. Development of common databases with
shared access may enhance the power of surveillance
to detect outbreaks.
Inadequate preparedness planning—The case study of
H5N1 influenza included a questionnaire evaluation of
preparedness planning. Of 51 (55%) people represent›
ing national influenza laboratories and surveillance
institutes of 14 member states, 28 (55%) responded.
Fewer than half the countries had plans in place at the
time of the outbreak that would have prepared them
for a pandemic influenza and no common EU plan was
in place, a situation that contrasts with the high level of
preparedness required by veterinary legislation in the
event of emergence of avian flu.14 Informants were
concerned about the lack of national and common
international planning for outbreaks of influenza,
including the issue of access to vaccine.
Inadequate funding arrangements—The case studies
show that the responsibility for funding investigation of
international outbreaks is unclear, and provision of
funds has been problematic. In one outbreak funding
was drawn from at least seven sources while in another
outbreak funds could not be identified when they were
needed. Inadequate links between surveillance net›
works and the European Commission programme for
emergency aid were illustrated by failures to assist
WHO in investigating outbreaks outside the EU.
Failure to link information to action—Surveillance
goes beyond collection of information and includes
ensuring appropriate public health action. One case
study concerned an outbreak of legionnaires’ disease
in citizens from four member states that was linked to a
location outside the EU. Although information was cir›
culated within public health networks, action to alert
the travel industry was delayed and further cases
occurred. The meningococcal disease outbreak study
incorporated an earlier review of national guidelines
for managing outbreaks.15 Substantial differences in
national responses to such outbreaks were revealed.
Unfortunately the evidence base for many of these
responses is weak, and further research is necessary if
prevention is to be consistent across the EU.
Failure to provide capacity for international outbreak
investigation—We considered the commitment to pro›
vide expert and financial resources to assist in
international outbreaks at the EU level to be inadequate.
Responsibilities for laboratory support, financing, and
Selected case studies
Case study Infection routes Incident features
Meningococcal disease1 2 Close/respiratory contact International festival in one country; cases occurring later in four member states
Salmonella food poisoning3 4 Foodborne transmission Food product produced in EU; cases found in four member states
Shigella food poisoning Foodborne/person to person transmission Unknown source associated with ferry transport between two member states
Legionnaires’ disease5 Airborne transmission, aquatic reservoir Outbreak occurring outside the EU involving citizens from four member states
Influenza H5N16 7 Zoonotic transmission, chicken to human. Threat
of person to person transmission
Potential for global epidemic beginning outside EU. Threat to all member states
Good Europe›wide surveillance and notification may help countries to prepare for epidemics
such as flu
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coordination of expertise for outbreaks beyond EU bor›
ders is unclear. In some cases Europe has depended on
the expertise of the US Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention. Of 43 past and current participants in the
European Programme on Intervention Epidemiology
Training (designed to enable the development of a cadre
of epidemiologists with common training within the
EU), 27 responded to a questionnaire on participation
in the management of an international outbreak. Only a
third had been involved in European networks, and
fewer than half had participated in managing an
international outbreak. Those participating in the
programme should be more involved in international
incidents and networking for further development of
capacity within the EU.
Failure to share lessons—Reports of lessons from
international incidents have generally been inadequate.
In only two of the four outbreaks with clinical cases in
Europe were final reports shared with the organisations
concerned. There is a need to disseminate best practice
in reporting results of investigations. The difficult issue
of ownership of data needs further consideration.
Discussion
Recent developments to facilitate international out›
break detection and management through the
networking approach within the EU have been
effective in improving recognition and response to
international infectious threats.16–18 However, weak›
nesses remain and opportunities for strengthening
collaboration were highlighted by this study. National
surveillance, which is the basis for effective inter›
national surveillance, needs to be improved. The
surveillance system in one member state failed to
ascertain 60% of community acquired legionnaires’
disease.12 It is likely that the coverage achieved in other
surveillance systems is similar or lower. Even for
meningococcal disease, where it is commonly thought
that almost all cases are notified, the best estimates sug›
gest that only about 90% of cases are reported.19 There
is a clear requirement for enhancement of many
national surveillance systems.
From the results of our study we recommend that
the European Commission further develops existing
disease›related surveillance networks. This will need to
be done within a framework in which organisational,
financial, and legal uncertainties are clarified. The
existing networks have shown their value, and we do
not see any additional value in the development of a
single, centralised European surveillance centre,
though coordination at the European level is
essential.20 The capacity for effective surveillance is
present across Europe, and available evidence shows
that it can be harnessed effectively with the use of
modern communications.
Untoward events, natural or deliberate, such as those
due to terrorism or biowarfare may appear simultane›
ously in multiple locations. Recognition of the nature of
the event requires alert clinical services and effective
reporting to national surveillance authorities. Early rec›
ognition that the event is of international importance
requires swift exchange of rumour, data, and infor›
mation between national authorities.
Increasing globalisation is likely to lead to further
international outbreaks. Responding effectively to
these requires coordination of national surveillance
and response systems within the EU and support for
enhanced surveillance and control activities in
developing countries. We have shown how a systems
approach to international surveillance and control of
disease can reveal areas of concern and identify
recommendations for improvement.
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Endpiece
Before sildenafil
Why then send Lampreys? Fie, for shame!
‘Twill set a virgin’s blood on flame.
This to fifteen a proper gift!
It might lend sixty›five a lift.
“To a Young Lady, with some Lampreys.” Poems on
Several Occasions, 1720, 1731, by John Gay
(1685›1732).
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